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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that
"[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that
is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."2
After years of struggling with the issue, the Court has taken an initial
step that may shift the balance between public regulation and private
property rights in favor of the landowner.3
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Id at 2895.
3. The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation" has always been the source of much con-
flict. Property owners believe they should be able to use their land in any man-
ner that they desire without physical or regulatory interference. Government,
however, sometimes decides that the use a landowner has in mind is not in the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
This Note will examine the impact that Lucas could have on the
struggle between public and private rights. First, the Note will pres-
ent the events leading up to the Supreme Court's consideration of Lu-
cas, including an examination of the three cases during the past
decade presaging this victory for private property rights. Second, the
Note will examine the majority's emphasis on a public nuisance con-
sideration in takings cases. Finally, this Note will consider how the
Court's new per se takings rule, which requires compensation when a
regulation denies a property owner all economically beneficial use of
his property, will affect takings jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Facts in Lucas
In 1986, David Lucas purchased two lots on a South Carolina bar-
rier island for $975,000. He intended to build single-family homes on
those lots, similar to the homes on neighboring lots. Lucas planned to
live in one of the new homes and sell the other. At the time he
purchased the property, Lucas's lots were not affected by any of South
Carolina's coastal zone building permit regulations.
In 1988, however, the South Carolina Legislature enacted a Beach-
front Management Act,4 which prohibited Lucas from building any
permanent structures, with the exception of a small walkway,5 on his
lots. Lucas filed suit and contended that, although the Act may have
been within the state's police power,6 it deprived him of all economi-
best interest of the landowner's neighbors or the community in general. When
these two sides disagree-when a landowner says 'yes" and the government says
"no"--controversy arises concerning just how far the government can go without
infringing on the property owner's Fifth Amendment rights.
Such controversies generally involve one of two types of interference: physical
occupation or regulations that restrict the use of property. In cases of physical
occupation, the courts have consistently found that a taking has occurred and
have ordered that the landowner be compensated. See, e.g., Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). When regulatory takings
are at issue, however, the courts generally have not been as willing to find that a
taking has occurred. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
During the past decade, however, the courts have relaxed their harsh stance
against finding that oppressive regulations are takings and have given some lever-
age to private landowners. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980)(Brennan, J. dissenting). And in Lucas, the
Supreme Court announced a new categorical rule that regulations that deprive a
landowner of all economically viable use of his property constitute a per se tak-
ing. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
4. 1988 Act No. 634,1988 S.C. Acts 5130 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-
250 to -360 (Supp. 1992)).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130 (1987).
6. Police power is generally defined as the power of a state to regulate private prop-
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cally viable use of his property and was, therefore, a taking.7
A state trial court held that the regulation left Lucas's property
valueless and awarded Lucas $1.2 million in compensation for the tak-
ing.8 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, and held that be-
cause Lucas had conceded the Act's validity the court was bound to
accept the Legislature's position that construction along the coastal
zone would harm a public resource.9 In holding there was no taking,
the court relied on the harmful or noxious use test developed by the
United States Supreme Court in cases such as Mugler v. Kansas.o In
Mugler, the Court held that there was no compensation due under the
Takings Clausen when a regulation prevented a public harm.-2
After the case was argued in the South Carolina Supreme Court,
but before a decision was rendered, the South Carolina Legislature
amended the Act, allowing property owners such as Lucas to apply for
a permit that would enable him to build on his lots.13 The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, however, decided the case without first requiring
Lucas to apply for a permit to determine whether the dispute could be
resolved extrajudicially.14
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a 6-3
decision, reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court, finding that the
South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the harmful or noxious
use doctrine was misplaced.5 The Court, in rejecting the doctrine's
erty in ways substantially related to promoting public health, safety, morals and
general welfare. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)("The term 'po-
lice power' connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment
upon private interests.").
7. A "taking" has been defined as "constitutional law's expression for any sort of
publicly inflicted private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of
compensation." Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165,
1165 (1967).
8. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991)(reporting
trial court decision), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
9. 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991).
10. Id at 899-902 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
11. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." The
Fifth Amendment is made applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Chicago B. & Q. RR. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 242 (1897).
12. The harmful or noxious use test used by the early Court allowed government,
through regulation, to prohibit a landowner from using his land in ways that were
deemed harmful to the community or public in general. See also Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)(upholding a regulation that prohibited a brickyard
from continuing operation in a residential area).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-290(A)(6), -290(D)(1)(Supp. 1992).
14. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 902 n.8 (S.C. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
15. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898-99 (1992).
1993]
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application, stated that it was nearly impossible to distinguish a regu-
lation that prevents a harmful use from one that confers benefits.16
The test, therefore, was essentially useless. The Court chose instead
to base its decision on common law principles of nuisance and property
law.17 It remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court to
determine whether Lucas's intended use of the beachfront lots was in
conflict with South Carolina's property laws or nuisance principles.S
B. Forerunners of Lucas
Commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has in the
modern era favored community control of property at the expense of
individual control and private property rights, at least where regula-
tion is concerned. 19 Beginning with its consideration of San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,20 however, the Court began to pave
the way for allowing individual landowners leverage in the battle be-
tween public and private rights. Although the majority declined to
review the lower court's decision because it was not ripe for review, 2 1
a strong dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices
Stewart, Marshall and Powell, suggested that when a regulation
works a taking, the landowner should be compensated.22 With four
justices clearly in favor of compensation for regulatory takings, it
seemed plausible that sometime soon that view might gain a majority.
Six years later, the Court rendered two decisions that began the
shift toward more private property rights.23 In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,24 the Court held that the Commission could not
condition a building permit on an owner's agreement to grant an ease-
ment across beachfront property without paying compensation.2 5 The
Court recognized the similarity between physical occupation and regu-
latory takings:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase
public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild
their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have
been a taking. To say that [the regulation] does not constitute a taking of a
16. Id-
17. Id- at 2901.
18. IM at 2901-02.
19. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1892, 1936 (1992). See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 511
(1934).
20. 450 U.S. 621 (1980).
21. Id at 633.
22. Id at 636-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
24. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
25. I& at 841-42.
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property interest but rather [is] ... "a mere restriction on its use," is to use
words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning.2 6
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles,27 the Court held that the government must compensate a land-
owner for a temporary taking when a regulation deprives the
landowner of all beneficial use of his property.28 The Court in First
English stated that the Takings Clause does not require eminent do-
main proceedings and physical occupation to effect a taking. "While
the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn prop-
erty in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doc-
trine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a
taking may occur without such formal proceedings."29 These three
cases were the first signs of potential winds of change concerning reg-
ulatory takings. It seemed clear that the Court was ready to closely
scrutinize regulations in determining whether a taking was involved.
III. ANALYSIS
A. A New Per Se Takings Rule
Perhaps the most significant step toward bolstering private prop-
erty rights was the Lucas Court majority's conclusion that denial of all
economically beneficial or productive use of land should be added to
the list of per se takings that do not have to be decided on the basis of
fact-specific inquiries.30 While the Court has consistently held that
physical occupation, no matter how slight, constitutes a taking,31 it
had been reluctant to extend the same protection to regulatory
takings.3 2
In adding deprivation of all economically beneficial or productive
use to its list of per se takings, the Court has indicated a willingness to
treat oppressive regulations that deny a landowner use of his land in
the same manner as situations in which the government physically oc-
cupies the property. To do otherwise is an injustice to property own-
26. Id. at 831 (citations omitted).
27. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
28. Id. at 318-19.
29. Id. at 316.
30. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). The Court
has consistently held that a physical occupation, no matter how slight, constitutes
a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In
non-physical occupation cases, however, the Court has generally engaged in ad
hoc factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case. The three
factors primarily considered are: (1) The economic impact of the regulation; (2)
the extent to which the regulation interfered with investment-backed expecta-
tions; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
31. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
32. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 419 (1982).
19931
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ers. Regulations that forbid property owners from using their land in
certain ways place the same amount of hardship on those landowners
as physical occupations.
In Lucas, for example, suppose the Coastal Council had decided
that Lucas's lots were an ideal location for an observation station from
which to monitor the effects of erosion along the coastline. Had the
Council physically taken possession of the property to conduct its re-
search, there is no doubt that a court would have found a taking.3 3 By
virtue of the Council occupying his land, Lucas would have been un-
able to use the property to build single-family residences. How does
this differ from what actually happened to Lucas?
In the actual case the state government, in the form of a regulation,
denied Lucas the right to use his property in the manner in which he
chose. In deciding whether there was a taking, it should make no dif-
ference that the Council was not physically present on the property.
It was, in a very real sense, "present" in the form of this regulation. In
denying a landowner the use of his land, the government essentially
ousts him from that property, and he should be compensated just as he
would be in a physical occupation case.3 4
Justice Holmes recognized that the hardship from regulation is
just as onerous as physical occupation when he stated in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon'5 that "while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing."36 Although Justice Holmes did not define how far is "too far,"
he realized that the legislature's power to regulate must be kept in
check. Allowed to regulate with no restraint, the legislature would
succumb to "the natural tendency of human nature... to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears."37
This is apparently what happened in a line of cases in which gov-
ernment regulation of wetlands areas directly confronted private
property rights.38 In several decisions the Court wrested control of
property away from private landowners and gave the government
33. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
34. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1987).
35. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
36. Id. at 415.
37. 1i
38. See Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972); Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963). But see Bart-
lett v. Zoning Comm'n of Old Lyme, 282 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1971)(holding that regu-
lations restricting use of a landowner's tidal marshlands were unreasonable and
confiscatory).
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carte blanche to prohibit certain uses in order to promote the "public
good" and preserve the environment.3 9
In Just v. Marinette County,40 the Wisconsin Supreme Court up-
held an ordinance prohibiting the filling of wetlands. The Court
stated there was no taking because the regulation attempted only to
maintain the "natural character" of the land and did not institute reg-
ulations that would drastically change conditions in the area.4 1 This is
analogous to the facts in Lucas. The South Carolina Coastal Council
had attempted to maintain the natural character of the South Carolina
shoreline by prohibiting Lucas from building on his lots. In so doing,
however, it stripped Lucas of much of the "bundle of rights"42 that he
assumed he had purchased with the land.
Similarly, in Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board,4 3 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision that a
landowner could not place fill on his property because the property
was "part of a valuable ecological resource and that filling would do
'irreparable damage to an already dangerously diminished and irre-
placeable natural resource.'"44 The court further held that "public
policy of the State has recognized the importance of these wetlands,
and strong regulations to protect wetlands have been enacted. The
regulations call for some sacrifices from all, in that land otherwise ide-
ally situated for private development is effectively rendered unavaila-
ble for that purpose." 45 This is apposite to what happened in Lucas;
the property concerned was rendered unavailable for private develop-
ment because of an onerous regulation. Through that regulation, the
South Carolina Legislature stripped Lucas of his fundamental rights.
Although environmental concerns and wildlife preservation are im-
portant and deserve careful consideration, individual private property
owners cannot be asked to bear the burden of supporting the environ-
mental movement as they were in Just and Claridge.46
It should make little difference whether a regulation is aimed at
preserving the status quo47 or whether it seeks to prevent a property
39. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
40. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
41. Id. at 768.
42. A property owner often is considered to possess a "bundle of rights" in the prop-
erty. The Court has held that when only one "strand" of this bundle is affected,
there is no taking. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). Accord Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
43. 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984).
44. Id. at 289.
45. Id. at 292.
46. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)(holding that requiring just
compensation for takings is "designed to bar Government from forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.").
47. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
owner from continuing to use his land in what a legislature or a court
considers an inappropriate manner.4 8 In both cases the regulation is
depriving a property owner of his rights, a deprivation for which he
should be compensated. Granted, the argument against compensation
in the former case may be somewhat stronger because the landowner
has not begun to exercise his rights, and the regulation, according to
some, takes nothing away from him. The regulation, however, does
prevent him from ever exercising rights that were expressly or im-
pliedly attached to the property that he purchased.49 He has, in this
sense, lost something of value and should be fairly compensated.
1. The Public Nuisance Exception
Although criticized by the dissenting justices for its line of reason-
ing,5 0 the Lucas majority, through Justice Scalia, stated that compen-
sation should be given if the use for which Lucas had purchased his
property did not conflict with South Carolina's traditional property
and nuisance laws.51 In other words, if building a house on the beach-
front property was something that traditionally would not have been
prohibited (either by existing property law or as a nuisance), Lucas
should be compensated for the loss of all economically beneficial use
of his property caused by a regulation that he could not or should not
have anticipated when he purchased the property.
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economi-
cally beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the pro-
scribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.5 2
The soundness of such reasoning is self-evident. Suppose, for ex-
ample, J purchases Yellowacre, a lakefront property in Minnesota
that is surrounded by resorts. If J purchased the property for the pur-
pose of operating a smelting plant, there is little doubt that county
regulations that prohibit such a business in a resort area should not be
perceived as effecting a taking. J should have realized that such an
operation in an exclusive resort area would likely be perceived as a
nuisance 3 and most certainly would be prohibited by zoning regula-
tions. J would have very little support for an argument that he should
48. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)(upholding an ordinance that pro-
hibited a property owner from continuing to operate a brickyard in a residential
area and finding no taking).
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904, 2919 (1992)(Black-
mun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id at 2900 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority).
52. I& at 2899.
53. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)(holding that
dirt, smoke and vibration from a neighboring cement plant constituted a
nuisance).
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be able to use Yellowacre in any way he chooses merely because he
owns the land.
Suppose, however, that after J purchased Yellowacre for $3 mil-
lion, the county zoning board, in an effort "to preserve the county's
wilderness areas," passes a regulation that prohibits J from operating
a resort or building any structures on his property. Clearly the right
to operate a resort was a right that "inhere[s] in the title"54 of Yel-
lowacre and one that J expected he could exercise. By enacting a reg-
ulation that prohibits J from operating any type of resort, the county
deprives him of all economically beneficial use of his property. There
is no conceivable way that J can begin to recover his investment. He
will not have the anticipated revenues from vacationers using the re-
sort, and J clearly will not find a buyer willing to pay $3 million for a
parcel of land that cannot be used. If J's resort would have caused no
nuisance-like harm, the regulation should either be lifted or he should
be compensated.
The Lucas Court's decision to allow a public nuisance exception in
determining whether there has been a taking is not a novel idea.55 In
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,56 the public nui-
sance doctrine played a major role in the Court's decision to uphold a
regulation that required fifty percent of the coal beneath certain
structures to be kept in place to provide surface support. The Key-
stone Court stated that just because "private individuals erred in tak-
ing a risk cannot estop the Commonwealth from exercising its police
power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance." 57 The Court fur-
ther explained, "The special status of this type of state action can also
be understood on the simple theory that since no individual has a right
to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others,
the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin
the nuisance-like activity."58
In using a public nuisance test, the Court ensures that the only
restrictions that deprive a property owner of all economically benefi-
cial or productive use of his land will be those that a reasonable person
could have or should have foreseen, which is a rational way to consider
54. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
55. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
56. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
57. Id. at 488.
58. Id. at 491 n.20. See also Nassr v. Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 987 (Mass.
1985)(holding there was not a taking where the government directed the cleanup
of a hazardous waste operation which was declared a nuisance); Kuban v. McGim-
sey, 605 P.2d 623 (Nev. 1980)(holding that an ordinance prohibiting prostitution
did not work a taking of a brothel). This reasoning and analysis is consistent with
the often-quoted maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (use your own
property in such manner as not to injure that of another).
1993]
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a takings question. While all property owners take title to land realiz-
ing that some regulation is inevitable,S9 such regulation should be
foreseeable in order to avoid being considered a taking.6o
2. Public Nuisance vs. Noxious Use
The public nuisance exception adopted by the Lucas Court major-
ity 61 is arguably similar to the test used by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.6 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court analogized the
Beachfront Management Act to ordinances that prohibit noxious
uses63 or uses that harm the public.6 4 In so doing, the South Carolina
Supreme Court stated that "discouraging new construction in close
proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great pub-
lic harm."65 Traditionally, if a regulation was intended to prevent a
public harm, no compensation was required.6 6 If, however, the regula-
tion's overriding purpose was to effect a public benefit, compensation
was in order.67
The South Carolina Supreme Court focused on the prevention of
harm aspect of the noxious use test. This type of analysis, the United
States Supreme Court held, was vulnerable to the varied interpreta-
tions of individual justices.68 In reversing the South Carolina
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court's majority strongly criticized the
harmful or noxious use analysis used by various courts for many years.
[Tihe distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that
which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objec-
tive, value-free basis; it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot
serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory "takings"-which require com-
pensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.6 9
The foregoing passage exposes the blatant flaw in the South Caro-
59. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)("Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.")
60. See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 165, 195-96 (1974).
61. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
62. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2886 (1992).
63. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)(upholding ordinance prohib-
iting manufacture of bricks in a residential area).
64. See, eg., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)(holding that it is not a taking for
government to destroy diseased cedar trees in order to prevent harm to apple
orchards); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)(upholding regulation against
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor because of harm to the public).
65. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
66. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
67. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Zoning Commission of Old Lyme, 282 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1971).
68. See innra note 76 and accompanying text.
69. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
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lina Supreme Court's noxious use reasoning- It is not possible, in most
cases, to distinguish between a regulation that prevents a harmful use
and one that confers a public benefit.70 Unfortunately, this gray area
has allowed courts to uphold many oppressive regulations, without
compensation, in the name of preventing "public harm."71
There is no clear answer to whether South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act's central purpose was to prevent harm or to benefit
the public.72 The South Carolina Supreme Court majority was con-
vinced that the Act clearly was intended to prevent a harm.73 A close
examination of the Act, however, reveals that several of the Act's
stated purposes refer to benefits that the public would receive from
prohibiting Lucas from building on his property rather than to per-
ceived harms that such construction would cause.
Section 48-39-250 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
(1) The beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina... serves the
following functions:
b) provides the basis for a tourism industry that generates approximately
two-thirds of South Carolina's annual tourism industry revenue which consti-
tutes a significant portion of the state's economy. The tourists who come to
the South Carolina coast to enjoy the ocean and dry sand beach contribute
significantly to state and local revenues;
(d) provides a natural healthy environment for the citizens of South Caro-
lina to spend leisure time which serves their physical and mental well-
being.
7 4
Granted, the Act also was meant to prevent possible harms that
could result from erosion along the coastline.75 But where should one
draw the line? If a regulation is equally intended to prevent harm and
to benefit the public, should the property owner be compensated for
half of his losses? If would seem unfair to give him nothing. If a legis-
lature were allowed to avoid compensation as long as some public
harm was purportedly averted by a regulation, the government would
almost always be able to regulate whatever it wanted without paying a
dime. A clever legislator or special interest group would merely have
to ensure that some portion of the regulation addressed a "dangerous
public harm" (real or imagined) that needs to be prevented. Such a
70. Id See also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
71. See, ag., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887).
72. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895,898-99,906 (S.C. 1991)(in-
dicating disagreement between the majority and dissenting justices as to whether
the Act's main purpose was to prevent a harm or to benefit the public), rev'd, 112
S. Ct 2886 (1992).
73. 1& at 898-99.
74. 1988 Act. No. 634 § 1,1988 S.C. Acts 5130,5130 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 48-39-250 (Supp. 1992)).
75. I&
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system is unacceptable. As the Supreme Court recognized, the nox-
ious-use/prevention of harm doctrines are too malleable.
Whether Lucas's construction of single-family residences on his parcels
should be described as bringing "harm" to South Carolina's adjacent ecological
resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that
the State's use interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any
competing use must yield. 76
There must be some benchmark against which potential investors
or property owners can measure their potential rights in the property
they own or intend to purchase. The public nuisance exception pro-
vides such a benchmark, as under this approach, property owners will
know where they stand. They will realize that they cannot use their
land in ways that cause substantial interference with others' property
rights or the public's rights in general and are either (1) intentional
and unreasonable or (2) unintentional but negligent, reckless or re-
sulting from an abnormally dangerous activity.77 There must be some
substantial interest that the government is trying to protect before it
is allowed to strip a landowner of his fundamental property rights.
A law or decree with such an effect must... do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance,
or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, or otherwise.
7 8
If private property rights are subject to ad hoc, random decisions,79
a landowner has little assurance that his rights in the property will
not be eroded. Basing takings decisions on what "inhere[s] in the title
itself" 0 will grant such assurance to property owners and potential
investors-if not completely, clearly more than a noxious-use test as
used by the South Carolina Supreme Court.8 1
B. Extending the Investment-Backed Expectations Test
Establishing deprivation of all economically viable use as a per se
taking,82 while limiting the test by the nuisance exception, is a logical
extension of a doctrine that began as merely one of several factors the
Court considered in takings cases.83 Consideration of the investment-
backed expectations of a landowner has played a role in takings juris-
prudence,8 4 as has the diminution in value test.8 5 As only one of sev-
76. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 (1992).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
78. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
79. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
80. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
81. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
82. See supa note 30.
83. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
84. Id-
85. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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eral factors, however, considerations of the landowner's investment
and expected return were too easily discounted.86
Recognizing deprivation of all economically beneficial use as a per
se taking means that property owners will have more assurance that
their investments and expectations will be protected. Property own-
ers will be able to gauge the feasibility of using their property in a
particular way-applying the nuisance standard87-before expending
large amounts of time and money in pursuit of an endeavor, only to
have the government put the project on hold with a restrictive regula-
tion. The new rule, however, is one step short of being solidly in favor
of property owners. The Court stated that deprivation of "all" eco-
nomically viable use constitutes a per se taking,88 which leaves a void
for the Court to fill in future takings cases.
The Eleventh Circuit has already recognized this void. In Reahard
v. Lee County,8 9 the court stated that the Lucas Court "left open how
the categorical takings rule... applies to situations in which a part of
the landowner's property is rendered unusable by a regulation."9 0
The new per se takings rule, in its present form, will not guarantee
that property owners will be able to use their property in any way
they choose. Indeed, regulations still may prohibit the most profitable
uses and not be deemed takings because they afford the property
owner "some" use of his land.91 But the test is a move in the right
direction. The Court indicated that it might consider granting partial
compensation to a property owner who loses "some" of the economi-
cally beneficial use of his property.92 Allowing such a recovery is nec-
essary to strengthen individual owners' property rights against
legislative prohibitions.
Clearly, the Court's decision will grant more leverage to property
owners who are faced with regulations that the legislature or some
special-interest group think are necessary. Applying the Court's new
per se takings test, with its public nuisance exception, does not usurp a
state's authority in protecting the public's interest. It merely provides
a check on that authority and keeps the Legislature from going
86. Although the Court in PennsJlvania Coal recognized that diminution in value
should be considered, it held that a land-use regulation will not result in a taking
merely because of diminution in value alone. Id- at 413. See also Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)(holding that a seventy-five percent dim-
inution in value resulting from a zoning law was not a taking).
87. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
88. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992).
89. 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992).
90. I& at 1134 n.5.
91. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2919 (1992)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
92. I& at 2895 n.8.
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overboard.93
Government still will be able to regulate brickyards, slaughter-
houses, and hazardous waste dumps that are considered nuisances in
certain locations. It will not, however, be able to deprive a property
owner of all economically viable use of his land-provided no nuisance
is involved-through legislation that some lobbyist thinks is in his or
her particular group's best interest.
This new test will have positive results for all involved. Certainly
the property owner wins; he now has some idea of where he stands
and what activities he can and cannot conduct on his property. Gov-
ernment also wins because it retains the power to regulate private
property owners so that they do not interfere with or harm their
neighbor's interests or the general public's interest.94 There must be
some limit to the legislature's authority to regulate. To echo Justice
Holmes, if the legislature is allowed to regulate with no restraint, it
will succumb to "the natural tendency of human nature... to extend
the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears."95
IV. CONCLUSION
At times during the past century, it seemed doubtful that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause meant anything to the courts or to gov-
ernment in general in the area of land-use regulations. Under the
guise of preventing "public harms," local and state governments
passed regulations that deprived property owners of their fundamen-
tal rights.
The democratic principles upon which our government was
founded were meant to allow people to control the government, not to
allow legislatures to strip citizens of fundamental rights through un-
controlled regulation. Granted, some regulation is necessary, but
when such regulation involves taking away fundamental property
rights, something must be given back in return.
In establishing a new per se takings rule premised on preventing
deprivation of all economically beneficial uses and in establishing a
public nuisance standard for evaluating regulations, the Supreme
Court has taken a positive step toward ensuring that oppressive regu-
lations that strip property owners of all of their rights will not be en-
forced without compensation. If the government wants to regulate
property use for no reason other than effecting a benefit for the pub-
lic, it should be willing to pay for that benefit.
This new per se takings rule will not allow property owners to use
93. See supra text accompanying note 37.
94. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900-01 (1992).
95. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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their land in harmful ways that benefit only themselves. The public
nuisance exception ensures that will not happen.9 6 If anything, the
rule will benefit the public. As a result of assurances gained through
Lucas, land developers should feel more confident that their rights
will be protected from oppressive regulations and may respond to
these assurances with new developments and projects that have posi-
tive economic results for many.
Kent A Meyerhoff '94
96. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900-01 (1992).
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